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City of Campbellton v. Gray’s Velvet Ice Cream Ltd. 1 —  
Liability of a Municipality in Nuisance for 
Property Damage Caused by Bursting of a 
Watermain.
CASE SUMMARY
Plaintiff ice cream manufacturer asserted claims in both negligence 
and nuisance after the flooding of its basement on four separate occasions 
caused extensive water damage to inventory. All of these incidents oc­
curred during the course of the defendant city’s involvement in a land 
reclamation project and construction of a Civic Centre on property at 
the rear of the plaintiffs premises. I he trial judge found that the first 
flood, caused by the bursting of a city watermain, gave rise to an 
actionable nuisance for which the defendant, having failed to establish 
the defence of statutory authority, was liable. The other three floods, 
caused by blockage of an outfall drain, were all found to have resulted 
from the city’s negligence.2 On appeal, held affirmed. There is an action­
able nuisance once damage sustained is adjudged an unreasonable inter­
ference with an occupier’s use and enjoyment of his property. For a 
municipality to escape liability on the basis of statutory authority, it must 
establish that such nuisance was expressly or impliedly authorized by 
statute and was the inevitable consequence of that wnich the statute 
authorized and envisaged.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Nuisance, as a legal concept, is peculiarly evasive of precise defini­
tion. It is trite law that the essence of the tort is an interference with 
another’s beneficial use or enjoyment of his property. Difficulties arise, 
however, when one attempts to reconcile the variety of distincdy different 
senses in which the term has been employed. It may be factually descrip­
tive of activity upon, or conditions of, the defendant’s property. On the 
other hand, it may refer to harm or annoyance resulting from such 
activity or conditions. Neither of these meanings is particularly indicative 
o f legal liability as that arises only upon a judicial determination o f the 
existence of an “actionable nuisance”.3
• I his finding of negligence was not questioned on appeal.
'(1981). 36 N*.B.R. (2d) 288 (N.B.C.A.).
’This problem o f definition has been recognized and discussed by a number of leading authorities in
I lie field o f tort law. See, for instance: Fleming, The Law of Torts, (5th ed.), at 393-4, and Street, The
Law i f  Totts (6th ed.) at 216.
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The m odern day tort of nuisance derives from the early thirteenth 
century assize of nuisance which developed as a remedy for interferences 
with privileges appurtenant to realty falling short of dispossession. This 
assize was replaced by an action on the case for nuisance in the earl\ 
fifteenth century.4 Developing contemporaneously was the private action 
for what was termed a “public nuisance", the essence of which was an 
interference with the exercise of common or public rights. The two 
actions, although both being categorized as “nuisance” were easily distin­
guishable by virtue of the fact that “public nuisance” did not require an 
interference with rights attaching to land.5 It has been suggested that 
this growth pattern may, in fact, have contributed to contem porar\ 
difficulties in delineating the scope of nuisance. What was once the 
generic expression of “wrongful harm ” developed into a catch-all for 
many varied and irreconciliable evils.6
Speaking in the broadest possible terms,
“. .  .all nuisances are caused by an act or omission, whereby a person is 
unlawfully annoyed, prejudiced or disturbed in the enjoyment of land; whether 
by physical damage to the land or by other interference with the enjoyment 
o f the land or with his exercise o f an easement, profit or other similar right 
to with his health, comfort or convenience as occupier o f such land."7
The key word is “unlawfully”. As was mentioned earlier, the nuisance 
must be actionable and to meet that criterion, it is essential that it be of 
a substantial and unreasonable nature.8 The law of nuisance does not 
remedy each and every interference. Rather, it seeks to balance the 
competing interests of people exercising their property rights to the 
fullest extent. It demands o f each of them a measure of flexibility.
Nuisance must also be distinguished from the tort concepts of tres­
pass, negligence, and the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.
Nuisance and trespass are complementary actions. The former re­
lates to incorporeal property rights, the latter to protecting an occupier's 
right of exclusive possession. This distinction manifests itself in several 
important respects. An action for trespass can be maintained only where 
there has been an actual intrusion onto the property by some person or 
object. Nuisance, however, may be invoked where the intrusion is bv a 
less tangible force such as smoke or noise.9 As well, “trespass is actionable
*lbid., Fleming, at 394. See also: T.A. Street. The Foundations of Legal Liability Vol. I. (New York: Edward 
Thompson Co., 1906) at 212-3.
slbid., Fleming, at 395.
*Salmond on The Law of Torts (17th ed.) at 50.
7Ibid.
1Supra, footnote 3, Fleming, at 401.
•Ibid., at 400.
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per se" whereas a nuisance is actionable only if it can be said to be 
unreasonable, and in most cases, if it results in “actual damage”.10
Actions in nuisance and negligence differ in both substance and 
result. “In nuisance one is concerned with the invasion o f the interest in 
the land, in negligence one must consider the nature o f the conduct 
complained of.”11 It is quite possible for a party to be held liable in 
nuisance without there being any fault on his part. The essential require­
ment is merely that“[t]he interference must be unreasonable in the sense 
that the plaintiff should not be required to suffer it, not that the 
defendant failed to take appropriate care.”12 The plaintiff who frames 
his case in nuisance will also receive the benefir of a shifting burden of 
proof once he has established that this “actionable negligence” does exist. 
It is then up to the defendant to exculpate himself. This differs from a 
negligence case in that the defence of reasonable care is not available to 
answer a claim of unreasonable interference.13
Nuisance and negligence are often confused, perhaps for no other 
reason than that the two frequently appear as alternative arguments in 
the same case.14 While one fact situation may give rise to both negligence 
and nuisance, it is not necessary to establish the former in imposing 
liability for creation of the latter.15
Perhaps more analogous to the tort of nuisance is the rule in Rylands 
v. Fletcher16 which may be summarized as follows:
“[a] person who, in the course o f  non-natural user o f his land, is held to be 
responsible for the accumulation on it o f  anything likely to do harm if it 
escapes is liable for the interference with the use o f the land o f another which 
results from the escape o f  the thing from his land.”'7
This rule is distinguishable from negligence in the sense that liability 
may be imposed on the defendant for conduct which is of neither a
'°Supra, footnote 6, at 54. The exception to this requirement o f actual damage is for interference with 
servitudes, i.e. a right-of-way.
" Royal Anne Hotel Co. Ltd. v. Village of Ashcroft (1979), 95 D.L.R. (3d) 756 (B.C.C.A.).
'*J.P.S. McLaren, Annotation to Royal Anne Hotel v. Ashcroft (B.C.S.C.) (1976), 1 C.C.L.T. 299 at 300.
lilbtd., at 301. See also supra, footnote 6 at 60.
“ Brownndge J.A. in Temple and Denton v. City of Melville [1979] 6 W.W.R. 257 (Sask. C.A.) at 261
elaborates on this idea and expresses the opinion that parties are relying on the defence of statutory 
authority while the cases being cited as authorities are those which were really decided on the basis o f
negligence or the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher and not nuisance.
“City of Portage La Pratrte v. B. C. Pea Growers Ltd. (1965), 54 D.L.R. (2d) 503 (S.C.C.) at 508.
'•(1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
1TSupra, footnote 3, Street, at 246.
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negligent nor an intentional na tu re .18 Its “affinity” with the law of 
nuisance, however, has been recognized for some time as is evidenced 
by Lord Simon’s statement in Read v. J. Lyons &  Co., Ltd. to the effect 
that the two “. . .might in most cases be invoked indifferently”.19 Still, 
these bodies of law are separated by the simple fact that there are 
circumstances in which liability may be founded on one but not the other.
The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher requires the “non-natural” use of land; 
such is not the case in nuisance. In fact, a “natural use” might be just 
one factor to be considered in the determination of whether the inter­
ference with the plaintiffs use of his property was unreasonable.20 It 
would also appear that Rylands v. Fletcher is restricted to those situations 
where there has been a physical accumulation on and escape from the 
defendant’s property. Nuisance, on the other hand, provides a remedy 
for injuries caused by intangibles such as noise.21
It is not difficult to see how a strict application of precedent might 
confuse the scope o f Rylands v. Fletcher and that of nuisance when 
statements such as the following are made by the courts:
“. . .1 am o f  the opinion that the defendant is liable on the basis o f nuisance, 
in that it collected, on its own lands and in its own sewerage system, quantities 
o f  water and sewerage and permitted such water and sewerage to be dis­
charged onto the lands occupied by the plaintiff company.”1*
The liability is said to be founded in nuisance, whereas the rationale is 
that of Rylands v. Fletcher. A crucial point then is the actual basis of 
liability in nuisance — is it the law of property or the law of obligations?23 
It may well be a combination o f the two in the sense that the law will 
impose liability in nuisance for interference with one’s enjoyment of his 
property but will do so only when that interference is unreasonable. In 
other words, the test is an objective one, fastening liability on an “. . .in­
terference beyond that which a land owner [or occupier] could reasonably 
be expected to tolerate.”24
'•ibid.
■•11947] A.C. 156 at 183.
**Supra, footnote 3, Street, at 228.
"Ibtd., at 261.
'*Famnew Suede and Leather v. City of Dartmouth (1979), 39 N.S.R. (2d) 290 (N.S.S.C., T.D.) at 306.
’’This idea is discussed in relation to percolating waters in an interesting case comment by Philip Girard, 
“An Expedition to the Frontiers of Nuisance", (1980) 25 McGill L f .  565-597.
l*lbid., at 597. See also Supra, footnote 3, Street, at 226.
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THE PRINCIPAL CASE
The principal case held the defendant city to be liable in nuisance 
for the water damage caused to the plaintiffs inventory. The first step 
in reaching such a decision was ascertaining the existence of an “unrea­
sonable” interference with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of its prop­
erty. In making this determination, Stratton J.A. appears to have relied 
heavily on the decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Royal 
Anne Hotel Co. Ltd. v. Village of Ashcroft, now on appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Canada.25 Both cases provide a thorough overview of the law 
of nuisance as it now stands in Canada. It would appear that where 
actual physical damage occurs, the court will have little difficulty in 
deciding that the interference was unreasonable. This view is very much 
in line with the basic foundation of liability in nuisance which directs its 
attention not to the defendant’s conduct but, to the ramifications for the 
plaintiff. In other words, if the interference was such that it could be 
said to be substantial and beyond that which could be reasonably toler­
ated, then an actionable nuisance has arisen.
Before making its final determination, the instant court was also 
called upon to deal with the defence of statutory authority pleaded by 
the defendant on the basis of s.7(l) of the Municipalities Act.26 The section 
states that a municipality “may” provide various services to its inhabitants, 
including water. The availability of such a defence in a private nuisance 
action, where the enabling statute is but permissive in nature, was set 
out by the Supreme Court of Canada in City of Portage La Prairie v. B.
C. Pea Growers L td .27. Martland J. concluded that:
“. . .the appellant, having created a nuisance which caused damage to the 
respondent, is liable therefor, because that which is com plained o f  as a 
nuisance was not expressly or impliedly authorized by the statute in accordance 
with which the lagoon was constructed, and was not the inevitable consequence 
o f that which the statute authorized and contemplated.”28
Applying this test, Stratton J.A., in the principal case, held the trial judge 
to be entirely correct in holding that the defendant city had failed to 
discharge the onus upon it. He went on to say such a finding was amply 
supported by the evidence on record.29
“ (1979), 95 D.L.R (3d) 756. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court o f Canada granted March 1, 1979, 
8 C.C.L.T. 179n (B.C.C.A.). This case was also cited with approval in Tempie and Denton v. City of Melville, 
supxi, footnote 14, which involved flooding caused by breaking of a municipal watermain.
“ R.S.N.B. 1973, c.M-22.
*T( 1965), 54 D.L.R. (2d) 503 (S.C.C.).
™lbid., at 508.
2*Supra, footnote I, at 10.
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ANALYSIS
The case is essentially a straight forward application of existing 
precedent.30 It is, however, a valuable and useful judgm ent for a number 
of reasons. It provides a very thorough and up-to-date overview of the 
law of nuisance and the availability of the defence o f statutory authority 
in Canada today. O f even greater import, this case reflects the substance 
of the tort of nuisance as a force quite distinct from negligence.31 The 
substance of the tort of nuisance is the impact of the defendant’s conduct 
and not the nature of the defendant’s conduct. It also becomes patently 
obvious that a num ber of advantages accrue to the plaintiff who can 
found his action in nuisance rather than negligence, principally, the 
switching of the burden of proof to the defendant.
From a strictly practical point of view, this decision may mean that 
municipalities in the province will be called upon with increasing fre­
quency to compensate citizens who suffer property damage as a result 
of broken watermains or sewerlines. The saving grace for municipalities 
may well lie in the fact that in the instant case, the city did not tender 
sufficient evidence to satisfy the court that . .there was no feasible way 
to provide a public water service and avoid the nuisance which oc­
curred”.32 It may well be that the above quoted statement of Mr. Justice 
Stratton will be utilized as the test for municipal liability in nuisance in 
New Brunswick in the future. There is also the possibility that munici­
palities, anticipating the difficulties in discharging such a burden of 
proof, may press for legislative reform of the Municipalities Act so as to 
protect them from liability for nuisances created in the course o f provid­
ing public services.33
The future utility of this judgm ent will depend, to a large extent, 
on the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Royal Anne Hotel 
appeal. If the decision of the British Columbia Court o f Appeal is 
affirmed, the present case should stand as a good precedent for some 
time to come.
KYMIL HOWE*
S0T he court appears to have approved the three major decisions mentioned. Namely, City of Portage La 
Pratru v. B.C. Pea Growers Ltd., supra, footnote 15; Royal Anne Hotel Ltd. v. Village of Ashcroft, supra, 
footnote 11; and, Temple and Denton v. City of Melville, supra, footnote 14.
slSimilar comments were made by J.P S. McLaren in his annotation to the Royal Anne Hotel case, supra. 
footnote 12.
ilSupra, footr.ote 29.
sslt is interesting to note that such provisions have existed in the legislation of other provinces for quite 
some time. See for instance, the Municipal Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 255, s.529.
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